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INTRODUCTION
I come not to bury Terry, but to praise it. Thirty years ago
Terry v. Ohio' established a conceptual framework for the Fourth
Amendment that makes more sense than any alternative the
courts or commentators have come up with since. That frame-
* Professor of Law, Alumni Research Scholar and Associate Dean for Faculty
Development, University of Florida College of Law.
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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work, which I call the proportionality principle, is very simple: A
search or seizure is reasonable if the strength of its justification is
roughly proportionate to the level of intrusion associated with the
police action. As the Court put it, "there is 'no ready test for de-
termining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search or seize against the invasion which the search or seizure
entails.' ,2 In Terry itself, this principle led to the "holding"3 that a
stop and a frisk need be justified only on reasonable suspicion,
rather than the higher probable cause standard required for more
invasive arrests and full searches.
If only the Court had applied Terry's proportionality frame-
work in a consistent fashion and extended it to the entire Fourth
Amendment universe, we'd be in much better shape than we are
today. Contrary to the suggestions of many commentators, 4 I
think that if the promise of Terry had been realized by the Court,
our law regulating search and seizure would be more, not less, co-
herent. We would have more protection of individual privacy, not
less. And race would be less of an issue in the law enforcement
context, not the all-pervasive problem it is now.
Unfortunately, instead of treating Terry's balancing formula
as a serious principle that requires some hard thinking, the Court
has used it as a smoke screen for an ad hoc agenda. Instead of
applying the proportionality principle to all Fourth Amendment
analysis, it has used it only in connection with seizures and a few
2 Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967) (alterations omitted).
3 As discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-44, the Court's language about
stops is dictum. Further, the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was never actually used in
the opinion. As Professor Saltzburg points out, "notwithstanding the fact that Terry is
widely known today as a reasonable suspicion case and as establishing a reasonable
suspicion standard, one can find nothing in the opinion of Chief Justice Warren to
support the claim that he thought that was the standard the Court was adopting."
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 911 (1998). But for all practical purposes the sentence in the text encapsulates
the standard wisdom regarding Terry. See CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND CONCEPTS ch. 11 (3d ed. 1993).
4 See William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discre-
tion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 614-25 (1984) (criticizing Terry for severing the
probable cause requirement from the reasonableness inquiry); Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) (stating that "the
dangers that [the balancing/reasonableness] approach poses to the security that the
Fourth Amendment is meant to ensure cannot be overstated and should not be over-
looked"); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mis-
chief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 401-04, 418-20 (1988) (criticizing the
"balancing" approach and arguing for an "exceptions" approach).
1054 [Vol. 72:1053
LET'S NOT BURY TERRY
other isolated scenarios. Accordingly, Fourth Amendment law is a
mess, to use the elegant phrasing of Professor Amar. It's a mess
not just descriptively, in the sense that police (and law students)
have a hard time mastering it,6 but normatively, in the sense that
it doesn't capture our core values.
In this paper I try to make the case for rejuvenating and re-
structuring Terry's proportionality principle. The principle needs
rejuvenation because its rationale-that the level of intrusiveness
should drive the level of justification-seems to have been ignored
even in cases purportedly applying Terry. It needs to be restruc-
tured because subsequent cases have been frustratingly vague
about the government and individual interests involved. In the
spirit of rejuvenation, Part I lays out the positive case for the pro-
portionality principle, in more detail than Terry and its progeny
have done. As a beginning to the restructuring process, Part II
looks more closely at the two sides of the Terry balancing for-
mula-invasiveness and justification-and fleshes out what as-
sessment of them should entail.
In the course of doing so, Part II defends this restructured
proportionality principle against various attacks that have been
leveled at Terry. From the left, these attacks include the argu-
ment that Terry's balancing formula is an insidious assault on in-
dividual freedoms because it undermines the probable cause stan-
dard and allows an amorphous pragmatic assessment of interests
that inevitably favors the government. From the right they in-
clude the contentions that the proportionality idea places restric-
tions on types of police actions that should not be subject to any
constitutional regulation and that it mandates judicial activism in
the Lochnerian mold. Any principle that can inspire such an out-
cry from both sides must have something going for it.
But there is one criticism of the proportionality principle that
has considerable punch. That criticism is that any effort to take
6 See Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994).6 But see Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the
Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1149 (1998) (arguing that Fourth Amendment law is relatively clear and that theory
cannot make it any clearer because search and seizure law, and the common law sys-
tem generally, is a "grown" system, like a jungle, not a "made" system). Despite the
limits of theory, I have persevered in my attempt to come up with a unitary theory of
the Fourth Amendment because, even if the Fourth Amendment is a jungle, I would at
least like to be responsible for one of its nicest trees.
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Terry's balancing formula seriously, which is what this paper pur-
ports to do, is ultimately unworkable. Part III briefly acknowl-
edges this problem and suggests ways of handling it.
In making these various points, I will refer fairly frequently to
an article I wrote several years ago.7 Although the structure of
this paper is suggested by that earlier article, most of the ideas
advanced here are either new or elaborations of the previous piece.
I want to thank the organizers of this conference' for giving me an
opportunity to flesh out these ideas, and the participants of the
conference for helping me develop them.
I. WHY TERRY WAS RIGHT: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONALITY
Terry was right, not only in its specific holding, but with re-
spect to its general approach to the Fourth Amendment. Terry
only purported to deal directly with the constitutionality of a
frisk.9 Basing its decision on the Reasonableness Clause of the
Fourth Amendment," Terry held that police may conduct a pat
down of the outer clothing if they have a reasonable suspicion that
doing so will prevent harm to themselves or others." This relaxa-
tion of the probable cause standard can be, and in large part was, 2
7 See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1991).Especially John Barrett, Charles Bobis, and Kathleen Hippolite.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 41-46.
10 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (asserting that "the central inquiry un-
der the Fourth Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security").
" See id. at 27.
12 In rejecting the argument that a frisk should only take place on probable
cause to arrest, the Court distinguished frisks primarily on invasiveness grounds.
At one point it stated: "[A frisk] must be limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and
may realistically be characterized as something less than a Tull' search, even though
it remains a serious intrusion... ." Id. at 26. It also stated:
It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only
when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person
has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified,
absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.
Id.
Degree of invasiveness was not, however, the only reason for permitting frisks
on grounds short of that required for an arrest. The Court also emphasized that "a
perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is pos-
sessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody." Id. For fur-
ther discussion of a danger rationale for Terry, see infra text accompanying notes
40-61.
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justified on proportionality grounds because a pat down is less in-
vasive than a full search, it does not require probable cause.
This rationale makes perfect sense, if one accepts two propo-
sitions: (1) the principal interest the Fourth Amendment protects
is individual security from government infringement on privacy,
property and autonomy (the latter in the sense of ability to control
one's movements and maintain dignity), and (2) the greater the
threat to that security, the greater justification the government
should have to show. I think both propositions are correct.
A. The Security Model v. The Trust and Coercion Models
The first proposition-what I will call the "security model" of
the Fourth Amendment because of the Amendment's use of the
word "secure"-has been widely accepted by the courts and aca-
demics since Katz v. United States," the case which first used the
reasonable expectation of privacy language to define the scope of
the Fourth Amendment. 4 Property and autonomy were already
clearly protected by the Fourth Amendment at the time Katz was
decided;15 that case added the privacy rubric to the protected cate-
gories. Recently, however, some commentators have attacked this
security model of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, it is worth em-
phasizing its bona fides.
To me, the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects
privacy, property and autonomy is clear from its plain meaning.
The amendment states that the people have a "right... to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures."16 To search means "to look into or
over carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover some-
thing"7 and to seize means "to take possession of' or to "lay hold
[of] suddenly or forcibly." 8 When the government looks into one's
13 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14 The expectation of privacy language actually came from Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring), but has since been
adopted by a majority of the Court. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-
41(1988).
's See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (asserting that the
Fourth Amendment is meant "to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupa-
tion of his dwelling and the possession of his property"); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 103 (1959) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when officers
"restrict liberty of movement").
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 1059 (1983).
'8 Id. at 1064.
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house or effects, or looks over persons or their papers, the interest
most obviously implicated is privacy. When the government takes
possession of a house, paper or effect, it is interfering with prop-
erty rights. And when it lays hold of a person it is most clearly af-
fecting one's autonomous control over movements, conduct and
dignity. I don't think it's too audacious to assert that the drafters
of the Fourth Amendment, who were particularly bothered by in-
discriminate intrusions into their possessions by British soldiers
in search of uncustomed goods,19 were trying to protect property
and autonomy and the closely associated notion of privacy with
their language.
Back in 1991, I argued that even if we were starting from
scratch, without a Fourth Amendment or its history, the security
model-which at the time I defined as an interest in regulating
government "intrusions" into privacy and autonomy-should be
the cornerstone of search and seizure regulation.0 I will not recite
that part of the article here. But since that effort, two important
arguments about the core of the Fourth Amendment have been
made, one by Professor Sundby2' and one by Professor Stuntz.22
Professor Sundby contends that privacy is a problematic basis
for regulating searches and seizures for at least three reasons.
First, the ease with which it can be manipulated in this techno-
logical age makes it an unsteady, constantly diminishing basis for
Fourth Amendment protection.2 Second, the "right to privacy"
rubric no longer convincingly justifies restriction of the govern-
ment's crime prevention efforts;4 as Sundby puts it, in these days
of anti-crime hysteria those who advocate for a criminal "right"
19 See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-41
(1969).
20 See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 6-7, 47-68.
21 See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
"See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
M2CH. L. REV. 1016 (1995).
2See Sundby, supra note 21, at 1758-63. He concludes that:
[bly making privacy the central factor in the Fourth Amendment's equa-
tion ... the Court unwittingly introduced a factor that, over the long term,
resulted in an overall decline in the Amendment's protections. This situa-
tion will only worsen as the inevitable march of government regulation fur-
ther blurs the notion of what is private and as technological advances en-
able the government to invade privacy in more pervasive, but physically
less intrusive, ways.
Id. at 1763.
" See id. at 1763-65.
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will not get very far unless they are "prepared to explain how the
protection benefits not only the individual claimant but all of soci-
ety."25 Finally, because privacy interests vary depending upon the
situation, reliance on the privacy notion as the basis for Fourth
Amendment protection has facilitated the demise of the unitary
probable cause standard, which Sundby clearly prefers, in favor of
a rudderless "reasonableness" analysis.26 For these reasons,
Sundby argues that privacy is no longer the best lens through
which to view the interests implicated by searches and seizures.
In its stead, he proposes that the Fourth Amendment be recon-
strued as a means of maintaining mutual government-citizen
trust27 (an approach I will call the "trust model").
Professor Stuntz disfavors privacy as the animating feature of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for somewhat different reasons.
He notes that the modern regulatory state, ranging from tax laws
to health and safety inspections, involves significant intrusions
into privacy, some much more significant than those associated
with criminal law enforcement searches that require probable
cause.28 Yet, he argues, these regulatory searches could not exist
if we were to apply the normal Fourth Amendment warrant and
probable cause requirements,29 and thus, privacy interests cannot
explain this area of the law. At the same time, he contends, the
Court's obsession with privacy has led it to neglect regulation of
the force often associated with street searches and seizures. 0
Bringing these two themes together, Professor Stuntz suggests
that, rather than privacy, coercion (i.e., the extent to which a
search or seizure involves a police-citizen encounter) should be the
primary focus of the Fourth Amendment3' (an approach I will call
2 Id. at 1765.
26 See i&- at 1765-71.
27 See id. at 1777 ("1 would characterize the jeopardized constitutional value un-
derlying the Fourth Amendment as that of trust' between the government and the
citizenry.").
28 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1033 (declaring that "information [obtained
through tax returns] is undoubtedly private in any ordinary sense of the word... [and
is] much more sensitive than the usual contents of my glove compartment").
29 See id at 1032 ("In all these [regulatory] areas, the type of regulation that the
government seeks to perform is impossible without compelled 'suspicionless' disclo-
sure-disclosure that precedes any showing that the government has a strong interest
in obtaining the information in this case.").
30 See id. at 1068 ("A focus on privacy has led to a great deal of law-sometimes
fairly protective, sometimes not-about what police officers can see. The doctrine pays
a good deal less attention to what police officers can do.").
3' See id at 1068, 1077 (calling signs that "police coercion is displacing privacy as a
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the "coercion model").
Despite these two excellent articles, I continue to believe that
securing our privacy, property and autonomy from invasion is the
fundamental focus of the Fourth Amendment. Professor Sundby's
trust metaphor is a useful heuristic in a number of ways. 2 And
Professor Stuntz is certainly correct that the courts have neglected
regulation of police coercion in the search and seizure context. But
privacy should remain at the core of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.
Professor Sundby's trust metaphor is an elucidating way of
explaining why, even in an age when subjective expectations of
privacy have been diminished substantially, the government must
make some showing before it can act.33 The state should trust its
citizens until it can prove they don't deserve to be trusted. But the
trust model doesn't help us figure out what that proof should be.
For instance, both government intrusions into our houses and gov-
ernment spying on our public movements evidence a lack of trust
and presumably should be regulated. But should both require
probable cause? Under the trust model one would presumably
have to answer yes; otherwise one citizen is being trusted more
than another.34 I think that some other referent for measuring the
government's showing is needed in these very different types of
cases.
focus of attention in the law of criminal investigation.., a good thing[,]" while brand-
ing as "backward" the fact that "we have a large and detailed body of law to tell police
when they may open paper bags or the trunks of cars" and very little law on "the level
of force that may be used in making an arrest or conducting a search").
" In addition to the points made below, see infra note 186.
33 For instance, covert government surveillance of the public streets does not in-
fringe subjective privacy expectations, yet it clearly suggests a lack of trust. Of course,
it could also be said that, regardless of one's subjective privacy expectations, one
should be able to expect privacy from random covert surveillance of public movements,
but the trust metaphor provides a more satisfying explanation.
'4 In an earlier article, Professor Sundby makes a distinction between "responsive
searches" (which involve searches that target individuals) and "initiatory searches"
(which, like residential safety inspections, are not aimed at any particular person). See
Sundby, supra note 4, at 418-20. Generally, he would only allow relaxation of the prob-
able cause standard in the latter situation, and then only when the government can
show that there is a compelling government interest in proceeding without probable
cause. See id. at 419, 430-42. The hypotheticals in the text are responsive searches and
therefore would presumably require probable cause. But even under the compelling
interest standard, unless the inconvenience of developing probable cause for public
surveillance is seen as "compelling" (in which case probable cause would virtually
never be required for a search), there would be no justification for proceeding on less
than probable cause in such a situation.
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The coercion model might provide that referent; a house
search could be seen as more coercive than covert tracking," just
as a street search is typically more coercive than a regulatory in-
spection (the paradigmatic comparison that Stuntz makes). How-
ever, I think these differences can be explained just as well by
pointing to the lesser degree of intrusion associated with public
surveillance and business inspections on the one hand,8 compared
to houses and an individual's person on the other. Furthermore,
the coercion model does not explain nearly as well as the security
model why we regulate completely uncoercive searches such as
electronic surveillance37 but do not regulate in any meaningful way
very coercive searches such as subpoenas for documents or testi-
mony.
38
3" As Stuntz says, "When the police gather information in ways that involve nei-
ther a confrontation nor a trespass, they usually are exempt from Fourth Amendment
regulation, no matter how private the information they seek." Stuntz, supra note 22, at
1056.
"6 Professor Stuntz makes much of the fact that business and other types of rec-
ords are fairly private, yet can be obtained through a subpoena issued on a mere
showing of relevance. But most business records do not contain private information,
only corporate data. When records do contain private information, a different result
might be appropriate. Cf Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028,
1050-51 (D. Haw. 1979) (holding that where the "regulatory search," here a search
for Medicaid fraud, is of patient records, the Fourth Amendment's warrant and
probable cause requirements apply with full force, because the privacy associated
with such records is significant).
Stuntz's most potent and frequent example of the small degree to which the
Fourth Amendment protects privacy is that the government can demand private
information from us every April 15. See Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1019, 1035, 1037,
1039, 1042, 1046. It is true that tax information is relatively private. The reason
this illustration still doesn't make Stuntz's point is his assumption that the govern-
ment's search for tax information is "suspicionless." Id. at 1032. Consider what
would happen if people were trusted to send in the right amount of tax each year
without providing supporting (private) information. My guess is there would be
plenty of cause to believe that many, and perhaps most, taxpayers would get the
amount wrong (intentionally or inadvertently). That cause would create sufficient
generalized suspicion, see infra Part III(B)(2), to justify the present system under a
proportionality approach.
7 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (requiring a warrant and other pro-
tections prior to electronic surveillance).
38 Although Stuntz concentrates on violent (street) coercion in his article, the co-
ercion associated with a subpoena can be significant. This is so not only because a sub-
poena forcibly seizes property or demands physical presence, but because of the sanc-
tion for noncompliance. This sanction is demonstrated by the fate of Susan McDougal,
who recently finished serving over 18 months in jail for failing to comply with a sub-
poena in connection with Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr's Whitewater investiga-
tion. See Allen R. Myerson, Whitewater Figure Again Defies Starr Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1998, at A22.
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Or use Terry itself as an example, assuming the correctness of
its holding that frisks may be based on reasonable suspicion of
danger. Which approach-the coercion model, the trust model, or
the security model-best explains that holding? Put another way,
which model best explains why a frisk requires only reasonable
suspicion while a full search requires probable cause?
Under the coercion model, one would presumably argue that a
search is more coercive than a frisk. But the sense in which a
search is more coercive than a frisk is virtually identical to the
sense in which it is more invasive; the coercion comes from the
search's greater intrusion into privacy, its interference with more
types of property, and its more prolonged insult to autonomy and
dignity. In other words, the coercion model adds very little to the
security model and, as a semantic matter, may not capture the in-
terests involved as accurately.
Under the trust model, as I suggested above, there may be no
way to justify the different treatment of searches and frisks. Both
actions imply a lack of trust, yet the trust metaphor does not im-
mediately suggest why the government needs only a suspicion
that the frisked person is not to be trusted while it requires prob-
able cause before a search can take place. I think Professor
Sundby might argue that Terry's relaxation of the probable cause
standard in the frisk context is based on the exigencies of the
situation-that is, the danger posed to the officer and others by an
unfrisked person-which the citizenry will understand and even
condone." But a frisk on less than probable cause is unlikely to
make people accustomed to a probable cause standard feel they
are sufficiently trusted unless the government can also point to
the fact that the invasion visited on them is minor relative to a full
search.
B. The Danger Exception
Whether or not it flows from the trust model, the interpreta-
tion of Terry just mentioned-that it is police safety, not relative
unintrusiveness, that authorizes a frisk on less than probable
cause-is worth looking at in more detail, if only because most
commentators seem to endorse it.4° Prevention of imminent harm
3 In an earlier piece, Professor Sundby defends Terry as an "emergency" exception
to the probable cause requirement. Sundby, supra note 4, at 420-25. He does not di-
rectly analyze Terry in his trust article.
, In addition to Sundby, supra note 4, both those who like Terry, see Saltzburg,
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is clearly a legitimate government objective. What is not clear is
why concern about danger should lead to an automatic relaxation
of the government's justification, without reference to the degree
of invasion associated with the government action. There are
three reasons to conclude that such a rule is a bad idea.
First, it doesn't explain the other "holding" in Terry. While
the Court explicitly purported to be avoiding a decision about the
"propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable
cause,"4 1 it followed this disavowal with the declaration that "a po-
lice officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropri-
ate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating pos-
sibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest."2 The Court went on to suggest that such a stop
may take place based merely on reasonable suspicion that
"criminal activity may be afoot;43 protection of the officer or others
need not be an objective of this initial encounter, or otherwise a
frisk would be authorized as soon as the officer approached the
individual, without the inquiries and further development of sus-
picion of danger mandated by Terry.4   As the Court stated in
moving from its analysis of stops to its treatment of frisks:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental
interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the
more immediate interest of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpect-
edly and fatally be used against him.
4
Those commentators who like Terry's indication that stops may
take place on reasonable suspicion (which presumably includes
every commentator who supports Terry's holding about frisks46)
supra note 3 (noting that "the Court saw a veteran police officer who made a quick
decision to protect himself and others from danger") and those who do not, see
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271 (1998) (speaking of "police safety" as the mo-
tivating force behind Terry) perceive officer safety as the primary justification forTerry.41 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
42 Id. at 22.
43 Id. at 30. See supra note 3 for a caveat to this description of Terry.
"See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30.45 Id. at 23.
46 Requiring probable cause for a stop would make a stop no different than an
arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes, and thus render Terry's holding concerning
frisks irrelevant, since an arrest authorizes a full search. See United States v. Rob-
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need to explain that preference on grounds other than officer
safety.
The second reason a danger exception to probable cause is
problematic is that prevention of future harm is not intrinsically
any more legitimate a goal than investigation of past crime. In
related contexts, concern over future harm doesn't justify reducing
the showing the government must make before it can act. For in-
stance, short-term pretrial detention on the basis of public safety
often requires proof of danger by clear and convincing evidence,47
which is more than the probable cause required for pretrial deten-
tion for past crime (i.e., an arrest).48 Most long-term criminal pre-
ventive detention statutes (such as those dealing with sexual
predators) require proof beyond a reasonable doubt,49 the same
standard of proof required at a criminal trial before long-term
punishment is imposed." While the Supreme Court has held that
the standard of proof for preventive civil commitment may be
lower than the standard of proof for criminal punishment," that
holding is based primarily on the assumption that commitment for
psychiatric treatment does not involve as significant a deprivation
of liberty as punishment (i.e., a proportionality rationale), not on
the idea that the government's burden should be less when it
wants to prevent harm.
5 2
inson, 414 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973) (discussing Terry's recognized distinction between
a limited search for weapons and a search incident to arrest).
47 See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (1985) (requiring proof by
clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions will rea-
sonably assure the safety of any other person and the community"). Other jurisdictions
require something closer to probable cause. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(b)(4)
(West Supp. 1998) (requiring a "substantial probability... that.., the defendant
poses the threat of harm to the community").
48 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (defining probable cause for an arrest).
49 See, for example, the first sexual predator statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
71.09.020(1) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person to be committed "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence").
0 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (discussing the "virtually unani-
mous adherence in common-law jurisdictions" to the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard).
5' See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (applying the clear and
convincing standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings).
52 See id. at 428-29 (justifying the clear and convincing standard on three grounds:
(1) "[in a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense"; (2) given
the fact that the effect of an erroneous commitment is not as great as an erroneous
conviction, "lilt cannot be said... that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go
free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed," and (3) the difficulty of
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The final and most important reason for distrusting a pre-
vention-of-harm exception to probable cause is its potential for
swallowing up the probable cause requirement entirely, given the
unknowable dangers that pervade police work. As Professor Har-
ris has demonstrated, 3 the lower courts are very willing to allow
what amounts to suspicionless frisks and searches in street en-
counter situations on the theory that danger lurks everywhere.
The Supreme Court has been more cautious, but it too has con-
templated the prevention-of-harm rationale in authorizing sub-
probable cause searches of houses54 and cars 5 when their occu-
pants have been arrested, as well as no-knock entries of homes
when there is reasonable suspicion of danger." The Court has also
relied on that rationale to permit, in the absence of any suspicion,
inspections of the area of the home immediately surrounding an
arresteeF7 and forced disembarkment of car occupants. 8 Not all of
these Court-sanctioned police actions would be impermissible un-
der a proportionality analysis; for instance, a cursory sweep of a
house solely for the purpose of finding confederates of an arrestee
(whose home has already been invaded) is not particularly intru-
sive and might be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.' 9 But a
fuller search of the home or of personal possessions on less than
probable cause would be disproportionate because these actions
are more invasive than a frisk (which only allows police to feel ob-
jects, not look at their contents"); similarly, suspicionless intru-
sions will usually be disproportionate precisely because some in-
proving dangerousness).
See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Su-
preme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 975 (1998).
' See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1990) (permitting "cursory" search
of arrestee's house if there was reasonable suspicion that confederates were there).
' See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (permitting search of the area
of the car accessible to its occupant if there is reasonable suspicion of danger).
r6 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421 (1997) (allowing police to
forego the knock and announce requirement if there is a reasonable suspicion that
announcing their presence will lead to evidence destruction or harm to officers).
r See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
8 See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 884 (1997).
'9 Indeed, the Court justified its decision in Maryland v. Buie in large part on
the ground that a cursory sweep is less intrusive than a full search incident to an
arrest of the type involved and prohibited in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
6 Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating, in dictum, that a
dog sniff is not a search because it detects only the presence of contraband).
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trusion is involved. In contrast, under a danger rationale which
pays no attention to degrees of intrusiveness, all of these searches
and seizures are perfectly justifiable: there is always the potential
for danger in any of these situations. What is ignored is that there
is also a great potential for using "danger" as an excuse to conduct
searches and seizures that would usually require probable cause.
Use of the danger rationale to justify Terry and the other
cases noted above is alluring because the harm seems preventable
and is very hard to discern; why not let police take the necessary
preventive steps? Carried to its logical conclusion, however, this
line of reasoning would do away with suspicion requirements alto-
gether. If we really want to prevent harm, we would permit frisks
of everyone the police encounter and sweeps of all houses in which
they find themselves. There must be some limiting principle here,
and that principle is the proportionality idea.61
C. A Sliding Scale v. Probable Cause Forever
One response to all of this might be that, contrary to the as-
sumption made above, Terry's endorsement of a reasonable suspi-
cion standard is wrong. This suggestion leads to an examination
of the second proposition stated above-that the greater the threat
to security posed by the government action, the greater justifica-
tion the government must show. Justice Douglas, for one, believed
this proposition to be specious. In his dissent in Terry, he argued
that if the government action threatens privacy, property, or
autonomy interests to an extent sufficient to call it a "search" or
"seizure," then it should always require probable cause.62 This
6' An unlikely but not unrealistic case that might test this approach is Justice
Jackson's famous example involving search of every outgoing car from a neighborhood
in which a child has been kidnapped. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson said he would "candidly strive hard to
sustain such an action... because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that
indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime." Id.
at 182. Consider how one might analyze this scenario under the proportionality ap-
proach. A brief stop at a roadblock to see the interior of a car would require virtually
no suspicion, cf United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), but if the offi-
cers want to look in the trunk, they would need probable cause or consent. Refusal to
give consent might lead the police to follow the car. But forcibly searching a car from
top to bottom simply because it happens to be near an area where a kidnapping took
place is not justifiable under proportionality reasoning. Under Justice Jackson's ap-
proach, which Professor Amar has endorsed, see Amar, supra note 5, at 802, the
Fourth Amendment would tend to disappear any time police want to solve a serious
crime. See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 31 n.109.
62 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The infringement on per-
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probable-cause-forever position has been endorsed by others as
well.'
There are two problems with this position, one pragmatic, the
other normative. First, it exerts incredible pressure on the courts
to reduce the scope of the Fourth Amendment by narrowly defin-
ing "search" and "seizure." For the probable-cause-forever position
does not dictate that stops take place only on probable cause; a
second option, apparently endorsed by the lower courts in Terry
itself,' is to hold that stops do not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment at all. The latter holding would have been much more likely
had the Terry Court felt compelled to require probable cause for
all seizures. Calling a brief stop a seizure and requiring probable
cause to justify it would either have made crime prevention vir-
tually impossible or have led to a vast expansion of "preventive
crime" statutes such as loitering and traffic laws, 6  designed to
give police probable cause for arresting those suspected of being
sonal liberty of any 'seizure' of a person can only be 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment if we require the police to possess 'probable cause' before they seize
him.").
63 See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 623-24 (1996)
(concluding that "[tihe core rule requires a warrant for every search or seizure" ex-
cept in circumstances in which "law enforcers cannot obtain warrants before they
must act"); Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause: Denying
the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 340 (1992) ("If the constitu-
tional scheme requires probable cause and a warrant for searches designed to pro-
duce criminal evidence, it is hard to imagine what further societal need would be so
significant that its presence should reduce the standard of suspicion and judicial
review."); cf Maclin, supra note 40 ("A police safety exception that merely requires
police suspicion-as opposed to probable cause-assured, as the nation's recent his-
tory has documented, that the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks and other disfa-
vored individuals would inevitably diminish.").
6 The majority opinion in Terry stated that "[tihere is some suggestion in the use
of such terms as 'stop' and Trisky that such police conduct is outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure'
within the meaning of the Constitution." See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. In support, the
Court cited, among other material, the Ohio Court of Appeals decision in Terry, which
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that no substantial constitutional
question was involved. See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966),
affd, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Indeed, at the St. John's conference Professor Meares conjectured that, without
Terry, the decisions in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) and its
progeny striking down vagrancy statutes on void-for-vagueness grounds would have
been much more difficult for the Court. See Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance
of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1343 (1998); see also, Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1076
n. 216 ("It is no accident that the 'stop-and-frisk' cases arose at the same time vagrancy
and loitering laws were being struck down.").
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up to no good. Combine the unattractiveness of these options with
the fact, of which the Terry Court was painfully aware,66 that the
exclusionary rule does little to deter low-level preventive actions
even when they are called "seizures," and a holding declaring
stops to be nonseizures might well have seemed the best among
bad choices.
Admittedly, a holding that a stop is not a "seizure" clearly
does violence to the normal meaning of that word, which might
have given the Court pause. However, the Court's cases defining
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes have shown no com-
punction about mutilating that term beyond recognition. 67  Be-
cause, as discussed in more detail below, the latter development is
directly related to the Court's adherence to the probable cause
standard in the search context, my best guess is that, had Terry
not adopted a sliding scale approach in the seizure context, that
threshold would bear even less semblance to common English us-
age than it does today.
Even if the Court had resisted this pressure-instead boldly
calling the stop in Terry a seizure and insisting on probable cause
for all seizures-it would have been wrong-headed in doing so.
This is not just because, as Professor Amar has so persuasively
argued, the text and history of the Fourth Amendment indicates
that reasonableness, not probable cause, is the touchstone of sub-
stantive Fourth Amendment regulation. 68  The normative argu-
ment against the probable-cause-forever position relies on the in-
tuition, reflected throughout our jurisprudence, that the
government's burden should vary depending upon the effect of its
actions on the individual. As already noted,69 we vary the stan-
dard of proof between criminal trials and civil commitment pro-
ceedings because of the perceived differences in the deprivation of
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 ("[A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusion-
ary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to
control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime.").
67 See infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
68 See Amar, supra note 5, at 782-85. Although much of what is said in this ar-
ticle and in my 1991 piece, see Slobogin, supra note 7, parallels Professor Amar's
work, I don't agree with his remedy package, his diminishment of the Warrant
Clause or his willingness to include the seriousness of the offense as a factor in rea-
sonableness analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42, 195-207, and supra
note 61. I also doubt he would agree with my generalized suspicion concept. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 162-86.
c9 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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liberty that each brings. We adopt different levels of scrutiny in
constitutional litigation depending upon whether the individual
right infringed by the government is "fundamental" or less so." In
the entitlements context, the degree of process due before benefits
71
can be terminated depends upon the effect of the termination.
Outside the constitutional setting, we do the same sort of thing.
In the tort context, for instance, many courts require greater proof
for punitive damages than for compensatory damages.72
A unitary probable-cause-forever standard thus cuts against a
pervasive normative-legal intuition. If taken seriously, it also
means that, just as we can't relax the required government justifi-
cation, we also can't ratchet it upward. Thus, requiring something
more than probable cause for serious bodily intrusions and elec-
tronic surveillance, as the Supreme Court has done,73 and for pri-
70 See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
601 (5th ed. 1995).
[m1n the post 1937 period we have had a dichotomy between the judicial
review of classifications employed in economic and general social welfare
regulation and review of classifications that either touch upon fundamental
constitutional values or use a criterion for classification which itself vio-
lates a fundamental constitutional value. Classifications of the first type
will be upheld so long as they arguably relate to a legitimate function of
government. Classifications of the second type, however, will be subjected
to independent judicial review, which means that the Court will not give
great deference to the legislature in those cases.
Id.
71 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976) (finding there is no need
for the evidentiary hearing required by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), when
the state terminates disability benefits rather than welfare benefits, since the for-
mer are not need-based and an erroneous determination will not work as much
hardship).
72 See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §3.11(4) (2d ed. 1993) (describing case law reject-
ing a preponderance standard and substituting a clear and convincing standard for
punitive damages given their punitive intent). I suppose the best counter-example is
that we apply the same reasonable doubt standard of proof at any criminal trial,
whether it's adjudicating capital murder charges or a misdemeanor. See In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying the reasonable doubt standard to a juvenile delinquency
proceeding). In practice, however, the procedures in the former instance (ranging from
jury and counsel rights to the nature of the sentencing proceeding) are much more pro-
tective. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (stating double jeopardy ap-
plies to capital sentencing because of its increased formality); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that there is no right to counsel if defendant does not face
jail term); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (declaring there is no right to jury
trial for petty crimes).
73 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (requiring that before conducting
surgery on a defendant for the purpose of obtaining evidence, the state must show
that the procedure does not unduly threaten the defendant's health or safety, or his
or her dignitary interest, and that it is necessary to effect the government's inter-
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vate papers, as the courts should do,74 would be inconsistent with
a unitary approach. Under the proportionality principle, on the
other hand, such superprotection makes perfect sense, given the
serious privacy invasions associated with such actions.
II. REVAMPING THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
To say that Terry's proportionality principle is the appropriate
framework for Fourth Amendment analysis is not to say that the
Court's version of that principle is acceptable. In fact, the way the
Court has manipulated Terry's insight is reprehensible. Even in
those cases where it has adhered to the spirit of Terry, the Court
has failed to develop any good framework for applying the balanc-
ing formula.
Refinement of that framework, or at least a start at doing so,
is the goal of this part of the article. Both the assessment of inva-
siveness that the proportionality principle demands and the man-
ner in which the government can justify its invasions require
analytical schemes that have yet to find their way into the case
law. In developing these schemes, I borrow liberally from the in-
sights of several people here at this conference, as well as my own
previous work.
A. Operationalizing Invasiveness
To implement Terry's proportionality principle, some assess-
ment of the invasiveness of the police action in question must be
made. The Supreme Court's efforts in this regard have been
abysmal. The Court has been remiss in three areas: defining the
threshold of the Fourth Amendment; differentiating the various
degrees of invasiveness; and incorporating into invasiveness
analysis other constitutional considerations.
est); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967) (requiring for electronic surveil-
lance a warrant plus a showing of "exigent circumstances," by which the Court ap-
peared to mean a particular need for the surveillance).
7' The Court has indicated that private papers are entitled to no more protec-
tion than other items. See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986);
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But good
arguments exist that they are entitled to special protection under the First, Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally
Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945,
987-88 (1977).
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1. The Fourth Amendment Threshold
As many commentators have pointed out, 5 the most obviously
flawed Fourth Amendment decisions from the Court are those
telling us what is not governed by that Amendment: prosecutorial
requests for bank records76 and phone number logs;77 use of under-
cover agents;7 trespassing on cornfields;79 flyovers of backyards;80
rifling through curbside garbage bags;81 using enhancement de-
vices to conduct surveillance of public movements 2 and business
property;' and so on. Although my students often disagree over
the relative invasiveness of these practices, no area of criminal
procedure is more likely to make them lose respect for the Su-
preme Court than the Court's blithe pronouncements that a per-
son who expects privacy in these situations is being unreasonable.
It just doesn't jibe with the type of society in which they thought
they lived.
The Supreme Court is almost as unimpressive when it comes
to telling us what is not a seizure: interrogations on busses;"
chases of fleeing youths;' pointed questioning about alienage at
one's place of work; 6 asking for ticket and identification at air-
ports. Perhaps if people were told they had the right to termi-
nate such encounters (which the Court insists they have)8 and the
police honored that right, then continued cooperation with the po-
lice could sensibly be said not to implicate the Fourth Amendment.
75 See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First
Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 549, 563-75 (1990) (concluding that "the Court has per-
mitted police surveillance powers to grow almost unchecked to their present epic
proportions"); see also Amar, supra note 5, at 783 (calling the Court's refusal to label
naked-eye searches "unconvincing and unworthy").
76 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976).
77See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
7'8 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
79 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
' See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
81 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
"See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
"See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
84See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (remanding to Florida Su-
preme Court for ultimate disposition on seizure issue).
"See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
See Immigration Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984).
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (stating that a person
subject to a Terry stop "is not obliged to respond" to questions).
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But the Court does not require such a warning" nor, if one were
given, would it likely alleviate the inherent coercion of such con-
frontations."
This truly depressing line of decisions is the direct result of a
twofold abuse of Terry. The first abuse is the implicit use of
Tery's proportionality principle to determine the threshold of the
Fourth Amendment. Although the Court has never acknowledged
as much, the only good explanation for the Court's unwillingness
to regulate so many actions that are clearly searches and seizures
is that it has decided that the cost to law enforcement of doing so
outweighs the "minimal" intrusions involved.9' Such an applica-
tion of the balancing formula is barred by the language of the
Fourth Amendment itself. That provision's prohibition on
"unreasonable searches and seizures" applies the reasonableness
test only after something has been labeled a search or seizure."
The second abuse of Terry in this context (which inevitably
follows from the first) is the failure to apply its proportionality
principle to actions which should have been designated searches
and seizures. If the Court had been willing to recognize that some
relatively less invasive "searches" and "seizures" can take place on
less than probable cause, it would have felt much more comfort-
able broadening the definition of those two terms.93 Indeed, in
many of the decisions in which the Court rejected application of
the Fourth Amendment, the police had developed a degree of sus-
picion that might have justified the action under proportionality
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
go See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1306 (1990) (stating that,
"[very few persons will have the moxie to assert their fourth amendment rights in
the face of police authority...").
9' The Court came closest to saying as much in United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 9-13 (1973), in which it held that grand jury subpoenas are not seizures be-
cause the "minimal intrusion" associated with such a subpoena is justified by the
investigative tradition of the grand jury.
9Terry itself made this point clear. After concluding that the stop and frisk is a
"serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person," 392 U.S. at 17, the Court stated
that "there can be no question.., that Officer McFadden 'seized' petitioner and sub-
jected him to a 'search.' " Id. at 19. The court then stated that it next had to decide
whether "at that point it was reasonable for Officer McFadden to have interfered with
petitioner's personal security as he did." Id. (emphasis added to show the Court's ap-
parent belief that reasonableness analysis kicks in only once the police action has been
denominated a seizure or search).
93 I elaborate on this point in Slobogin, supra note 7, at 77-78.
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reasoning. For instance, in Oliver v. United States,' which per-
mitted trespass on private property outside the curtilage, the po-
lice were acting on "reports" that the defendant was raising mari-
juana on his farm.95 In California v. Ciraolo5 and California v.
Greenwood," respectively permitting suspicionless flyovers and
rifling through garbage, the police were acting on tips about drug
possession.9" In California v. Hodari D.," holding that chases are
not seizures, the police had seen the defendant flee before them. 100
Although the police in these cases did not have probable
cause, they may have had enough suspicion to justify, under a
proportionality scheme, their relatively uninvasive actions. If so,
the Court could have had its cake and eaten it too. It could have
brought these actions within the compass of the Fourth Amend-
ment and still approved them. Instead it has read vast domains of
intrusive police action out of the Fourth Amendment.
2. Establishing a Hierarchy of Invasiveness
These examples lead to the next question about invasiveness
that the Court has failed to answer satisfactorily: How are we to
gauge the relative intrusiveness of a police action that is consid-
ered a search or seizure? The Court has given us some guidelines
in this regard. With respect to seizures, for example, the Court
has told us that a Terry stop is less invasive than an arrest, 0' and
that a brief stop at a sobriety roadblock is less invasive than either
a stop or an arrest.0 2 The factors it has relied on in making these
types of assessments include the extent to which police rely on a
show of force, the length and cause of the detention, the extent to
which the detention is routinely applicable to everyone (as with
roadblocks), and where the detention takes place.'0 '
With respect to searches, the Court has indicated that
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
"' See id. at 173.
96 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
97 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
'8 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209 (stating that police had an anonymous tip); see
also Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37 (noting that police "received information").G499 U.S. 621 (1991).
See id. at 629.
101 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19.
102 See Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976).
103 See generally WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at §3.02 (discussing
Supreme Court case law distinguishing arrests from other types of detentions).
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searches of houses and luggage are more invasive than searches of
cars, 104 which in turn are more invasive than frisks,05 drug testing
in the school or workplace,0 6 and most other searches in the latter
two arenas."7 It has also indicated that regulatory inspections of
gun and liquor stores and the like are even less invasive. In ar-
riving at these conclusions, it has looked at the extent to which
privacy has traditionally been associated with the area searched,
whether privacy is diminished because of a connection with the
public sphere (as with public roads and workplaces), and whether
there was foreknowledge that privacy is minimal in some contexts
(e.g., workplaces, schools, pervasively regulated industries).0 9
Neither these conclusions about autonomy and privacy inter-
ests or the factors used in reaching them are clearly out of whack.
But the Court has also told us that the fundamental inquiry about
our security vis-a-vis the government depends upon "expectations
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "" If that is the
10 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (listing reasons why
cars have a "diminished expectation of privacy" vis-a-vis houses and luggage).
'05 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
106 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (concluding
that collecting urine samples from fully clothed students while they are monitored
from behind involves "negligible" privacy intrusion); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989) (asserting that "the 'operational reali-
ties of the workplace' may render entirely reasonable certain work-related intru-
sions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as unreasonable in other
contexts").
107 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) ("Public employees' expec-
tations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets... may be reduced by vir-
tue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation."). Although
New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985), insisted that a search of a child's
purse, "no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a se-
vere violation of subjective expectations of privacy," it noted that privacy expecta-
tions might change if the search focused on a locker, desk or other school property.
Id. at 337 n.5. Further, its subsequent decision in Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, sug-
gests that even its stance with respect to purses might have shifted somewhat.
108 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (declaring that,
"[wihen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business [sale of
guns] and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his busi-
ness records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection"); Col-
onnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (holding suspicion-
less, warrantless searches of liquor stores permissible).
109 See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 43-46.
1 0 This language first appeared in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), but has since appeared in majority opin-
ions in a number of cases. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40
(1988) (stating that an expectation of privacy will only give rise to Fourth Amend-
ment protection if society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively rea-
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proper test-and the subjective, personal nature of privacy and
autonomy suggests it is-then why not determine what society
thinks is reasonable? Because the Court has made no attempt to
do so, its invasiveness hierarchy is ultimately suspect."'
Society's views can be gleaned in at least two ways. The first
is to look at the positive law on trespass, contract and so on for
clues as to what areas and items we think are private. 12 When, as
is often the case, that source does not help, research of the type
that I have done with Joe Schumacher, sampling how citizens rate
the intrusiveness of various types of police actions, may be use-
ful."' Although the use of empiricism to settle normative ques-
tions can raise troublesome issues,... these quandaries largely dis-
appear where the content of the law explicitly depends upon the
answer to an empirical question.
Many of the Court's intuitions about invasiveness-e.g., that
bedrooms are more private than cars, which are more private than
junkyards-are borne out by our research.' But many are not.
Not surprisingly, the gap between the Court's views and the views
of the "society" we sampled is greatest in those cases in which the
Court has held that police action does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. For example, our sample viewed undercover activity
of intimates and government perusal of bank records, both of
which the Court has left unregulated, as much more invasive than
sonable); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (stating that "[tihe touch-
stone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy"); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 122 (1984) (noting that in order to be considered a search covered by the Fourth
Amendment, it is necessary to determine whether it infringes on "an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 144 n.12 (1978) (stating that legitimation of expectations of privacy must be
based on references to concepts of real or personal property law or to understand-
ings recognized by society).
M At the St. John's conference, Professor Stuntz suggested that we cannot
measure constructs like privacy, stigma, and the effects of racial discrimination.
William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213 (1998). Perhaps
we can't in any scientific way, but the suggestions made below should get us pretty
close.
112 See Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of
Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993).
113 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
"Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
114 See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform
Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315 (1996).
5 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 113, at 739-40.
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a Terry patdown."6 A proportionality approach based on the re-
search would not only denominate the former investigative activi-
ties to be "searches" but might well require more than reasonable
suspicion to justify them. Similarly, while flyovers of backyards
and looking through garbage bags were not considered as intru-
sive as a pat down,1 7 they were seen as much more intrusive than
looking at the exterior of a car or going through a magnetometer
at an airport."' These findings suggest that, under a proportional-
ity rule, some credible reason for the former types of action is nec-
essary.
Our research also calls into question some Court decisions
about investigative techniques that it is willing to call a search or
seizure. Take, for instance, the Court's assumptions that we ex-
pect appreciably less privacy at work and at school."' A theoreti-
cal rationale for recognizing diminished privacy protection in these
locales, obliquely suggested by the Court's cases,120 is that many of
the searches conducted there are relatively benign, particularly
when they can be characterized as administrative rather than
criminal in objective. Indeed, our research suggested that when
the motivation of a search or seizure is seen as protective or facili-
tative rather than adversarial, the perceived intrusiveness of the
action diminishes significantly. Illustrative is the finding that
subjects viewed rummaging through luggage at an airport as no
more intrusive than a dog sniff or searching a sixth grader's
16 Out of 50 scenarios assessed by our sample on a scale of 0 (for not intrusive)
to 100 (for very intrusive), a pat down was ranked (hereafter designated by R) 19th,
and had a mean score (hereafter designated as M) of 54.76, while using a chauffeur
as an undercover agent (R=31; M-67.56) and a secretary (R=34; M=69.98) were
viewed as more intrusive. See id. at 738-39 (Table 1).
117 Flying 400 yards above the backyard in a helicopter was ranked 10th
(M=40.32) and going through garbage was ranked 13th (M=44.95), compared to a
patdown (R=19; M=54.76). See id.
"8 Going through a magnetometer at an airport was ranked 2nd (M=13.47) and
inspecting the exterior of a car was ranked 4th (M=19.46). See id.
"9 See supra notes 106-07.
1 0 For instance, in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995),
the Court justified random drug testing of student athletes in part because the
testing "was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care." In
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 n.5 (1995), the Court deferred deciding
whether the reduced protection it endorsed for schoolchildren would apply if the
search had been carried out by police looking for evidence of crime rather than
school teachers investigating disciplinary infractions. Cf Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (discussing "public acceptance" of residential health
and safety inspections).
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locker;" apparently, this result stemmed from the perception that
the airport search was designed to prevent a serious danger that
could not effectively be averted in other ways." Residential and
business inspections for the purpose of ensuring safe living and
working conditions were viewed the same way.'23
However, our research also suggests that when searches in
these settings are not imbued with facilitative aims, people's pri-
vacy expectations, contrary to the Court's assumption, are height-
ened. 4 Apparently searches in the school and workplace for drug
usage, contraband and disciplinary infractions are not as easily
encompassed by the Family Model of criminal procedure;2z they
seem to be perceived as adversarial invasions rather than pater-
nalistic. If so, the proportionality principle would demand greater
justification than mere assertions that schools and workplaces
have drug or disciplinary problems, which is in effect the Court's
current stance.
26
3. Incorporating Other Interests Into Invasiveness Analysis
A third deficiency of the Court's case law is closely related to
the second. As Professor Amar has pointed out, 27 the Court has
utterly failed to take into account those interests aside from pri-
vacy, property and autonomy that are protected by other provi-
sions of the Constitution. The First Amendment (in connection,
for example, with searches of newspaper offices or diaries), the
Sixth Amendment (in connection with subpoenas of attorney files),
the Equal Protection Clause (where race is involved) and the Due
121 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 113, at 768-69 (discussing empirical
support for an "implied consent" theory when the government's object is to prevent
imminent harm (as in airport frisks) or to facilitate and aid (as in fire, safety, and
health inspections)).122 See id.
1'2 See id. at 769.
124 Compare the following findings to a patdown (R=19; M=54.76); using a secre-
tary as an undercover agent (R=34; M=68.98); accompanying subject of drug test to
a urinal at work and listening for sounds of urination (R=39; M=72.49); searching a
high school student's purse (R=41; M=75.14). See id. at 738-39 (Table 1).
1 Cf. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third 'Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 380-83 (1970) (discussing a "family model" of
the criminal process which would, inter alia, assume good faith on the part of gov-
ernment officials).
126 See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
127 See Amar, supra note 5, at 804-11 (describing how the Court's focus on war-
rants and probable cause has made difficult the integration of values from the First,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments into search and seizure analysis).
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Process Clause (where police conduct shocks the conscience) all
may independently add weight to the individual's side of the bal-
ance, thus requiring more by way of government justification.
Because Professor Amar has already made the basic argu-
ment, 12 I want to focus on just one aspect of it-the equal protec-
tion aspect, or to be more blunt, race. Professor Maclin has ar-
gued in Black and Blue Encounters129 that, in evaluating
individual interests under Terry, the Court should take race into
account; the added coercion and anxiety blacks feel when con-
fronted by the police should be considered in determining inva-
siveness. He bases this position on convincing proof that the po-
lice target minorities for stops and other confrontations,'130 and
that the latter group has grown to expect and resent that fact.1
3
'
However, he also bases it on the conclusion that "[t]he ruling in
Terry was a significant setback in the fight against discriminatory
police tactics,"1 ' a setback which can be redressed only by aban-
doning race-neutral analysis.
13
If Professor Maclin is saying that discriminatory tactics make
an otherwise reasonable search or seizure unreasonable, perhaps
on a Fourth-Amendment-plus-equal-protection theory, I have no
quarrel with him."3 For instance, I think Whren v. United
128 See id.
".. Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"--Some Preliminary Thoughts
about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243
(1991).
' ' See id. at 250-55.
131 See id. at 255-62.
132 Id. at 267-68.
' See id. at 268-78.
'3' However, if he really means that cops should have to have more suspicion to
stop a black person than a white person (it is ultimately hard to tell from his arti-
cle), I think he is off base. Giving blacks more leeway to commit crime is not going to
solve the race problem.
That does not mean we should not try to lessen the subjective sense of invasion
blacks feel. Two suggestions made at the conference might go far toward accom-
plishing this goal. First, Professor Fyfe recounts that, when he was a police officer,
he would explain to people he had stopped why he had done so, and even occasion-
ally had the stopped individuals listen to the radio dispatch that occasioned the
stop. See James J. Fyfe, Terry: A[n Ex-] Cop's View, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1231
(1998). Our research confirms that knowledge of the objective of a search lessens the
sense of intrusion. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 113, at 759-60 ("[Tlhis
study provides clear support for the proposition that searches and seizures tend to
be viewed as more intrusive when.., their objective is not clear rather than speci-
fied."). Of course, to the extent police cannot come up with a credible race-neutral
reason for the stop, they should be embarrassed out of stopping the individual in the
first place.
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States,"5 which has almost done away with the pretext doctrine, is
wrongly decided, in part because it allows and even encourages
discriminatory tactics.3 6 To the extent abandoning race-neutral
analysis means resurrecting pretext arguments, I agree with Pro-
fessor Maclin wholeheartedly. Where I disagree with him is in his
assertion that Terry does the same thing as Whren. There are
three reasons for that disagreement.
First, reasonable suspicion is not a hunch; it requires an ar-
ticulable belief that criminal activity is afoot. Some of the exam-
ples Professor Maclin gives in his article, such as the round-ups of
black youth by the Boston police in the wake of the Stuart shoot-
ing,137 are clearly not authorized by Terry. Unfortunately, they
probably would have happened regardless of how the Supreme
Court decided that case. Professor Maclin may be right that an
officer who confronts a black man "knows that he has unchecked
discretion to make the stop.""8 But that is not Terry's fault; it is
the fault of a society that does not make the officer obey Terry.
That gets to the second point. Professor Maclin's target
should not be Terry, but the lack of remedies for discriminatory
police action. As the Terry Court itself pointed out,"9 the exclu-
sionary remedy is virtually useless in this situation because most
The second means of diminishing the sense of invasion felt by blacks is to make
clear they are not being targeted to the exclusion of whites. At the conference, Pro-
fessor Amar noted that in some situations stopping everyone is less invasive than
stopping only a certain subgroup. See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amend-
ment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998) ("Attention to issues of race
and sex and possible discrimination yields a surprising thought: sometimes equality
values may counsel a broader search or seizure, and perhaps this broader search-
though more threatening to privacy values-may be more constitutionally reason-
able because less susceptible to discrimination and discretion.").
135 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
"' The Whren Court did indicate that if a police action was the product of in-
tentional racial discrimination, relief must be sought under the Equal Protection
Clause, see id. at 1774, but the Court's case law in this area makes proof of such
discrimination virtually impossible. See David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and
All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 551-53 (1997).
1,7 See Maclin, supra note 129, at 257; see also id. at 251-52 (describing six
cases, none of which involved reasonable suspicion).
138 Id. at 259.
"9 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968) ("The wholesale harassment by
certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly
Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence
from any criminal trial.").
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stops never lead to a prosecution in which to invoke it. 4 ' I do not
agree with Professor Amar,'' however, that his package of jury
damage awards, injunctions and class actions will take care of the
problem.' Nor, contrary to Professor Fyfe's suggestion,' do I
think the police can be counted on to take care of this situation
themselves.' As I have argued elsewhere, 4 ' an "ombudsman" in-
dependent of the police-who can discern patterns of misbehavior
better than attorneys with individual or even class clients, who
can make officers pay out of their own pocket for bad faith and
discriminatory actions, and who has the power to obtain dismissal
of the worse miscreants-is a much more powerful remedial device
than these traditional ones.
Third, once such an effective remedy is in place, the version of
Terry's proportionality doctrine advanced here is ultimately more
likely than a probable cause standard to deter bad faith police ac-
tion against African Americans and other people of color. That is
because, again, it avoids the pressure that a probable-cause-
forever standard creates to enact low-level crime prevention stat-
140 At the St. John's conference, Professor Fyfe recounted data from New Or-
leans indicating that only 1 out of every 100 people stopped by police were prose-
cuted for crime. Even if more prosecutions were to occur, the exclusionary rule
would likely have little effect on police under great pressure from their bosses and
the public to inhibit crime and criminals. See Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of
Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 26-33 (1978)
(describing the multiple incentives for officers to exhibit a crime control bias regard-
less of legal constraints imposed by judiciary).
14 See Amar, supra note 5, at 811-20.
142 As Professor Steiker points out, "widespread public support for unrestrained
police power... suggests that.., popular juries would be unwilling to find much po-
lice conduct 'unreasonable'.... Juries will often fear the robbers more than the cops
because the robbers tend to be mostly poor and/or members of minority groups and be-
cause the cops tend to focus their attentions on just such disfavored groups." Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 850 (1994).
143 See Fyfe, supra note 134.
144 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION 563-65
(2d ed. 1998) (detailing historical and conceptual problems with police-initiated sanc-
tions). Fyfe himself tells the story of one officer who "tossed creeps every night until he
found one who was dirty" and yet was regarded as an "asset" by his supervisor and
commander. See Fyfe, supra note 134. Fyfe also notes that many police officers "hold
the view that unfruitful frisks are a positive public relations device because they dem-
onstrate to the innocent citizens stopped that police are vigorously doing their jobs."
Id.
145 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It,
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1058 (1996). For further treatment of this point, see
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, U. ILL. L.
REV. (publication forthcoming).
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utes, and leaves investigative stops (as well as casual police-
citizen encounters) entirely unregulated. At the same time, it does
not, like a probable cause standard would, abandon preventive law
enforcement. As Randall Kennedy has suggested, the latter out-
come might well visit real discrimination on communities of color,
given the fact that they tend to be victimized by crime much more
often than other communities. 1
46
B. Justification Schemes
Terry recognized that one justification standard was not
enough, and it created reasonable suspicion to help fill the void.
But the Supreme Court has never seriously followed up on Terry's
insight that government justifications can and should come in all
shapes and sizes. Thus, while adhering to a probable cause-
reasonable suspicion matrix in connection with seizures, it has
only applied that dyad in search contexts involving "special
needs."'47 In other settings in which neither standard is easily
met, the Court has usually resorted to undifferentiated assertions
about "strong" government interests and the like.14 The result is
a mess, both practically and normatively.
The Court should develop a justification hierarchy that con-
sists of at least four tiers, and that applies across the board to all
searches and seizures. To probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion should be added a higher clear and convincing standard and a
lower relevance standard. There follows a description of the four
standards, an examination of when they would apply, and a brief
14 See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination:
A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1994) ("Although the administration of
criminal justice has, at times, been used as an instrument of racial oppression, the
principal problem facing African-Americans in the context of criminal justice today
is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the laws.").
147 The special needs rubric first surfaced in Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(involving searches in public schools for disciplinary infractions), but has since be-
come the label applied to a host of situations in which "ordinary law enforcement" is
not involved. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620
(1989) (stating that regulation of railroad employees to ensure safety " 'presents
"special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from
the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements'") (quoting Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987)
(asserting that investigation of workplace infractions involves "an interest substan-
tially different from 'the normal need for law enforcement' ") (quoting T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J. concurring)).
148 See infra notes 175-77.
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exploration of how all this fits in with the Warrant Clause.
1. The Four (?) Tiers
The best place to start is probable cause, because it is the
standard with which we are most familiar-except that we don't
really know what it means. It is often defined as a more-likely-
than-not finding, or perhaps a level of certainty just a little below
that.9 But can we be serious about that definition? Are we really
willing to allow police to arrest someone when there is a 50%
chance they have the wrong person? Are we willing to let the po-
lice ransack a house when there is a one-in-two chance they've got
the wrong place?
Then there's reasonable suspicion, defined by a group of fed-
eral judges as approximately a 30% level of certainty. 150 Appar-
ently a stop may constitutionally consist of a fifteen to twenty mi-
nute detention.' Are we really willing to subject two innocent
people to such inconvenience, embarrassment and discomfort in
order to nab one bad actor?
These questions may strike some as meaningless at best and
disingenuous at worst, given the difficulty of translating percent-
ages into anything police and magistrates can use on the street.
15 2
But they're similar in tone to how we talk about standards of
proof. For instance, the reasonable doubt standard is often dis-
cussed in terms of our willingness to let nine guilty people go free
to ensure that one innocent person is not convicted. 53 To get some
idea of the type of justification we want to require for invasive po-
lice actions, we need to think about analogous normative queries.
If it were left up to me, I'd require arrests and searches of
houses, car interiors and luggage to be based on clear and convinc-
ing justification (usually quantitatively defined at about a 75%
level of certainty), a stance which might not be that far from the
149 See generally WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
3.3(b) (1985); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evi-
dence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982)
(summarizing a survey of federal judges).
'50 See id. at 1327-28 (summarizing a survey of federal judges).
'5' See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). Although the Court in
Sharpe noted that part of the 20-minute detention in that case was the defendant's
fault, see id. at 687-88, its main emphasis was on the "diligence" of the police in car-
rying out their investigation. See id. at 694 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Note, however, that statistical information relevant to whether the government
is justified can often be generated. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
13 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972).
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position of some courts and even some police officers on the mat-
ter.' For more invasive actions (e.g., a body cavity search; elec-
tronic surveillance; perusal of private diaries; particularly pro-
longed, invasive undercover operations), I would additionally
require clear and convincing proof that the evidence thereby
sought is crucial to the state's case and that the search will be
conducted in the least intrusive manner possible.155 For prolonged
stops and similarly invasive seizures, I would require what we
presently call probable cause (i.e., a 50% likelihood); the same
standard should apply to undercover intrusions of the same ap-
proximate length.5 ' For short stops, pat downs,'57 and many of the
actions that the Court excludes from Fourth Amendment over-
sight-e.g., flyovers, searches of open fields and garbage, and more
than casual encounters at roadblocks and on the street-I would
require reasonable suspicion, which I would define to be some-
thing like a 20% to 30% chance of success.'58
154 One study of seven jurisdictions found that, depending on the jurisdiction, be-
tween 75% and 100% of all warrant-based searches of homes and similar locations dis-
covered evidence of crime. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT
PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES 23-24 (1985); see also H.
RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 77 (1988) (quoting officer who said: "I wouldn't
lock anybody up on less than 90 percent sure").
"5 The suggested standard is probably not that different from what the Court
already requires with respect to serious bodily intrusions and electronic surveil-
lance. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
15 As I have argued elsewhere, the intrusion associated with many types of un-
dercover activity is no different from that associated with overt police conduct; if
anything, the covert nature of undercover activity exacerbates the intrusion. See
Slobogin, supra note 7, at 103-06; see also, Christopher Slobogin, Deception, Pretext
and Trickery: Investigative Lying by the Police, 76 OR. L. REv. 755, 805-08 (1997)
(distinguishing between "passive" and "active" undercover activity, with the latter
requiring ex ante review and a cause determination).
157 The subjects in our research seemed to think that the intrusion associated with
a pat down is not as great as the intrusion associated with the initial stop. See Slobogin
& Schumacher, supra note 113, at 738 (questioning on public sidewalk for 10 minutes,
R=36, M=69.45, compared to a pat down, R=19, M=54.76). This assessment might be
based on the perception that a pat down discloses to police only the shape and feel of
an object, not its contents or appearance. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
"' This standard would not handcuff or overly endanger the police, contrary to
Professor Saltzburg's suggestion in his article for this conference. See Saltzburg su-
pra note 3. Professor Saltzburg states that:
[Ihe majority in Ybarra fails completely to tell the police what they were
supposed to do if someone in the bar turned his back on the police, reached
into a pocket, began to move around outside the sight of the officers, or did
anything else that would fall short of reasonable suspicion but scare any
officer who had any sense.
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That leaves the lowest standard-what I'm calling the rele-
vance standard-to be defined. Evidence at trial is relevant if it
has any tendency to make a fact in issue more probable than
not.'59 The relevance standard would require police to articulate a
reason for believing their action has some tendency to lead to in-
formation that would help solve a crime or apprehend a suspect.
Put statistically and arbitrarily, it might require a 5%-10% suc-
cess rate. Using legal terminology, the relevance standard could
be said to require demonstration of an "objective credible belief'
that a "legitimate law enforcement objective" will be achieved
through the police action.6 ' I would apply this standard to all but
the most casual police-citizen questioning... as well as to regula-
tory inspections of businesses and homes.
Under a proportionality approach, the animating inquiry in
setting these levels of suspicion should be how much explanation
for a given intrusion is necessary to convince an innocent person
subjected to it that the police acted reasonably. The innocent per-
son who is arrested will expect a "damn good reason" for the in-
convenience. The innocent person who is stopped on the street for
a brief interrogation is likely to be satisfied with a much less ex-
tensive explanation for the interruption. The official excuse for a
mistaken action should be adequate, but need be no more than
To me, any of the actions described by Professor Saltzburg would authorize a
frisk and the seizure necessary to effect it. The possibility of danger is high-at least
at the reasonable suspicion level-when someone who has just been told by the po-
lice that the bar is going to be searched for drugs turns his back, reaches into a
pocket or hides from the police. On the other hand, the standard would prevent po-
lice from frisking everyone in the Ybarra bar in the absence of such suspicious be-
havior.
'59 See FED. R. EVID. 401.
'60 This is a combination of the brief stop standard adopted by the New York
courts in cases like People v. de Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-72 (N.Y. 1976) (requiring
"some objective credible reason" for the "minimal intrusion of approaching [an individ-
ual] to request information"), and the standard adopted by the ABA to govern techno-
logically-assisted physical surveillance of public places. See Christopher Slobogin,
Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association's Tenta-
tive Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 416-18 (1997) (defining the legiti-
mate law enforcement standard).
161 Admittedly, there is difficulty in defining what is "casual." As Fyfe notes:
There often is no bright line between merely initiating a conversation with
a person who looks vaguely wrong and detaining someone against his will.
On the street, both interactions usually begin with words like, 'Hi. Can I
talk to you for a minute?" or "How you doing? I was hoping you'd be able to
help me with something here."
Fyfe, supra note 134.
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adequate, to dissipate the umbrage the action excites. This is the
central insight of the proportionality principle: The justification
for a search or seizure should nullify its intrusiveness, no more
and no less.
2. The Myth of Individualized Suspicion and the Importance of
Rationality Review
The next aspect of the justification scheme that needs signifi-
cant fine-tuning concerns the type, rather than the amount, of evi-
dence the government must proffer in order to meet its justifica-
tory burden. The courts often mantra the idea that suspicion
must be "individualized.""'2 Terry itself appeared to endorse this
position; at one point, the majority opinion stated that "in deter-
mining whether the officer acted reasonably..., due weight must
be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is enti-
tled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.""s One con-
sequence of this preference for particularized suspicion is frequent
judicial expression of concern over police use of "investigative
profiles" based on statistical information, particularly those rely-
ing on correlations between certain types of behavior or features
and criminal activity (e.g., drug courier profiles)." To distinguish
this nomothetic, or group-based, type of evidence from individual-
ized suspicion, I have called it "generalized" suspicion."
'2 Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1301 (1997) ("To be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing") (citation omitted); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560
(1976) (opining that "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequi-
site to a constitutional search or seizure") (citation omitted); Wilcher v. City of Wil-
mington, 842 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, "'some quantum of individualized suspicion! on the particular individual seized
is required").
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 27 (1968).
'" The U.S. Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether use of profiles is per-
missible. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1 (1984). Most lower courts hold either that profiles cannot establish reason-
able suspicion or can do so only when supplemented with other facts. See Morgan
Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Re-
view of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 851 nn.37, 38 and accompanying
text (1985). As one commentator has stated, "profile factors that do not relate specifi-
cally to the 'particular conduct' of the suspect will be discounted." Charles L. Becton,
The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected that th' Infected Spy, as All Looks Yellow
to the Jaundic'd Eye", 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 458 (1987) (citation omitted).
"5 See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 57, 81-86.
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The conceptual case against reliance on generalized suspicion
appears to be premised on the idea that use of profiles and the like
undermine human autonomy and the notion of individualized jus-
tice.'66 But the distinction between individualized and generalized
suspicion is, in all relevant respects, meaningless. To justify the
stop he made in Terry, Officer McFadden needed the general
knowledge about behavior of criminals that he had learned from
his 39 years on the force as much as his specific observations of
Terry, Chilton and Katz. Indeed, if one looks closely at the last
half of the sentence quoted from Terry in the previous paragraph,
the Court recognized precisely that fact. Put another way, had
Officer McFadden taught a class of rookies how to identify poten-
tial burglars, those officers who later relied on his stereotypes and
behavioral tips in nabbing their first Terry or Chilton would not
somehow be violating the Fourth Amendment.17 If a profile can
produce the success rate required by the proportionality principle,
then its contents or the fact that it is based on knowledge of past
perpetrators is not all that important. We might not permit race
'6 See Cloud, supra note 164, at 853; see also United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d
583, 600 (5th Cir. 1982) ("A profile does not focus on the particular circumstances at
issue."). I criticize these arguments in Slobogin, supra 7, at 82-85. Here I only sum-
marize one of the points I made in the earlier piece.
Critics of profiles have also pointed out that many profiles appear to be ad hoc
in nature, and not really worthy of the name. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out how elements of drug courier
profiles have been manipulated from case to case, apparently to justify seizures af-
ter the fact); Becton, supra note 164, at 470 ("[Tjhe profile simply is too susceptible
to selective enforcement and retrospective application to support a retreat from
Terry's requirement of objective factfinding.") (citation omitted). This criticism of
profiles is well-taken, but is aimed at the implementation of profiles, rather than
their underlying premise.
'6 I take this example from JOHN MONAHAN & LARRY WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 226-27 (1985). After writing this sentence, I learned
from the transcript of the suppression hearing in Terry, provided by the organizers
of this conference, that Officer McFadden had not once in his 39 years observed a
stick-up. See Defendants' Bill of Exceptions, State v. Terry and State v. Chilton
(Nos. 79,491 & 79,432), reprinted in Appendix, State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton
and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Tran-
scripts, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1387, 1477 (1998) [hereinafter Terry transcript].
Never one to let a fact get in the way of a good theory, I still think the example
makes the point. I am bolstered in this assertion by the observation of Mr. Payne,
the state's attorney in Terry, that Officer McFadden had plenty of experience with
criminals in his 39 years that stood him in good stead on the day he made his fa-
mous stop. See Reuben M. Payne, The Prosecutor's Perspective on Terry: Detective
McFadden Had a Right to Protect Himself, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 733 (1998).
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and like variables to be included in such a profile,'68 but we should
otherwise consider it to fall within the Fourth Amendment's dic-
tates.
The hostility toward generalized suspicion is not only concep-
tually misguided; it is also pragmatically insidious. That is be-
cause without such a notion there can be no meaningful justifica-
tion requirement in a vast number of search and seizure scenarios
where separating the innocent from the guilty on an
"individualized" basis is virtually impossible. Consider that, as
construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment imposes
virtually no limitations on roadblocks for the purpose of detecting
illegal immigrants69 and drunk drivers,70 or drug testing of cus-
toms workers' and student athletes, or regulatory inspections
of residences 73 and businesses,74 even though the Court concedes
that all of these situations involve searches or seizures. Leery of
imposing difficult-to-meet individualized suspicion requirements
in these situations, the Court has been satisfied with claims by the
government that its action will address a "significant" criminal or
regulatory problem; 75 once this allegation is made, the Court
leaves virtually everything else up to the state. In traditional con-
stitutional jurisprudence terminology, the Court is engaging in
what is, at most, rationality review.
76
'6 But sometimes we might. For instance, if the perpetrator of a crime is known
to be black, that fact obviously should be included in any profile. Cf Slobogin, supra
note 7, at 89 (arguing that the use of race as a criterion for determining who should
be referred to the secondary checkpoint at an immigrant roadblock, at issue in Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, might be justifiable on the ground that illegal immigrants are likely to
be Hispanic).
169 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
'70 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
171 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
172 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
173 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
174 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311 (1972).
175 See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54 (noting the magnitude of the drunk driving
problem and thus that "the choice among... reasonable alternatives remains with...
governmental officials.. ."); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (stating that
the pervasively regulated business exception to the warrant requirement is met if the
government has a "substantial" interest in the business activity being regulated); Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-58 (asserting that the illegal immigration problem is
"substantial" and that roadblocks will apprehend many such immigrants); see also in-
fra note 177.
'76 Stuntz may have been the first to recognize this point clearly. See Stuntz, supra
note 22, at 1033 (describing the Court's special needs and regulatory cases as
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That result would not be possible under a proportionality re-
gime which recognizes the generalized suspicion concept. Let's as-
sume that the government wants to initiate drug and alcohol
testing using urinalysis in a particular workplace. Let's also as-
sume that the government cannot demonstrate individualized
cause, i.e., cause based purely on observation of individuals' be-
havior at work, either because drugged behavior is not easily ob-
servable or because it is too difficult to post observers over every-
one. While the Court would usually permit the drug testing
anyway, at least so long as the government produced any credible
evidence that the testing is necessary to prevent a threat to health
and safety,177 a proportionality analysis would require more. As-
suming that urinalysis testing is sufficiently invasive so that un-
der the proportionality principle, it requires probable cause
(defined above as about a 50% level of certainty),78 the govern-
ment would need to show that roughly 50% of the relevant em-
ployees are at risk for drug use. Only if it can demonstrate a gen-
eralized suspicion at the requisite level should it be able to
conduct the test.
Requiring this type of proof may seem like a classic Catch-22
situation, given the inability to conduct the drug test. However a
resourceful government can often develop cause in multiple ways.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,79 for exam-
ple, the government was able to show, based on data obtained
prior to any suspicionless testing programs, that at least 45 of the
train accidents and incidents that occurred between 1975 and
"reasonableness review of ordinary regulatory legislation").
1'7 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 661 (concluding that the governmental
interest in deterring drug use among physiologically vulnerable children is
"compelling," and that drug infractions at the school in question had increased in re-
cent years); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1989)
(citing the possibility that without drug testing, psychoactive substance use among
employees might go undetected, with the consequence that lives might be lost and
railways would be unable to obtain information about the causes of major accidents);
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (noting that the "national interest in self protection could be
irreparably damaged if those charged with safeguarding it were, because of their own
drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics" or impaired while
using their weapons). But see Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (holding
that the state interest of ensuring that illegal drug use does not impair the ability of
elected officials to carry out public functions, or undermine public confidence and trust
in elected officials, is insufficient to justify suspicionless testing).
178 See supra text accompanying note 156.
'79 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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1983 were caused by drug or alcohol-impaired employees.18 If
that number amounts to somewhere near half the train incidents
during that period, the requisite generalized suspicion would exist
for anyone who causes or is involved in a train accident or safety
violation. If it doesn't, individualized suspicion would typically
need to be -shown before a particular individual could be tested.
Generalized suspicion would play a similar role in other sce-
narios the Court has confronted. If, as I would argue, factory
safety inspections' 8 should at least have to abide by the relevance
standard,"2 the government would have to demonstrate that such
inspections (in whatever geographic area and industry the gov-
ernment chooses) have a one-in-twenty chance at success. If police
wish to search private junkyards for stolen parts,'" which our
subjects thought involved an invasion analogous to a pat down,"
they would have to show a one-in-three probability that evidence
of fencing will be discovered.
In short, Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal
protection rationality review "with bite," if not strict scrutiny."
Courts evaluating the reasonableness of a search or seizure,
whether it is in the street or regulatory in nature, or whether it is
of an individual or a group, should demand from the government a
specific showing of need that is proportionate to the invasion.!8
See id. at 607.
181 Cf Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that obtaining a
warrant for such inspections does not depend on a demonstration of probable cause,
but on satisfiing reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting it).
182 In our study, the scenario which came closest to a factory inspection,
searching a coal mine (R=16; M=52.17), fell just below a pat down (R=19; M= 54.76).
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 113, at 738 (Table 1). However, when our
subjects were told that the goal of the coal mine search was to discover safety viola-
tions (rather than left uninformed of its purpose), its rank dropped to 8 out of 50,
which puts it closer to the relevance level. See id. at 763 (Table 3).18 Cf. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
84 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 113, at 738 (Table 1) (searching a
private junkyard (R=17, M=54.15); a pat down (R=19, M=54.76)).
18 See supra note 70.
186 Or, if that showing is not forthcoming, an explanation why it is not possible to
make should be presented. If the government, despite diligent efforts, cannot generate
the necessary data to permit informed speculation about the problem, it might be en-
titled to conduct the proposed search in an effort to get the relevant justifying infor-
mation. Professor Sundby's trust metaphor is useful in explaining why. For Sundby,
searches in the absence of suspicion are nonetheless permissible if the government can
show that "trusting the citizenry is simply too costly given the immediacy and impor-
tance of the government interest." Sundby, supra note 21, at 1802. If the government
can convince the citizenry that there is a compelling state interest that can only be met
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Courts should not acquiesce to what the Supreme Court has per-
mitted: searches and seizures justified solely by vague assertions
about the magnitude of whatever problem the government has
targeted.
Although this type of review is a throwback to Lochnerism,
187
it is defensible Lochnerism. It is defensible not just because of
footnote 4's exemption of government actions affecting fundamen-
tal rights,188 and not just because the Fourth Amendment's Rea-
sonableness Clause appears to call explicitly for substantive due
process analysis,' 9 but because the proportionality principle is the
right normative approach for all Fourth Amendment situations.
In an article bemoaning the difficulty of applying the Fourth
Amendment in the modern context,9 ' Professor Seidman illus-
through suspicionless searches, then the citizenry may be willing to put up with such
investigative techniques, and indeed may even be grateful for them. Without such a
showing, on the other hand, the damage to government-citizen trust would be signifi-
cant. See id. at 1800-01. In a sense, Sundby is saying that a strong showing of need al-
leviates the perceived intrusiveness of the action. See supra text accompanying notes
119-23.
'87 The Lochner era, so-named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in
which the Court struck down a state law regulating work hours on substantive due
process grounds, is maligned today as an example of the Court acting as a super
legislature in deciding between different regulatory regimes. Professor Stuntz, for
one, has argued that courts should continue to shy away from this type of analysis:
Wherever the regulatory state engages in any form of compelled informa-
tion gathering (and it does so everywhere), there is an enormous cost to
taking privacy interests seriously: doing so requires judicial judgments
about whether one regulatory path is more reasonable than another. That
sounds uncomfortably close to the regime that the Supreme Court sought
to bury a half-century ago.
Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1034.
'8 In United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Supreme
Court rejected Lochnerism, but in footnote 4 suggested that legislation which un-
dermined fundamental rights or discriminated against "discrete and insular mi-
norities" would still be subject to rationality review. See id. at 153 n.4.
'9 See Amar, supra note 5, at 811. Professor Amar argues:
Unlike the Due Process Clause, in whose name so much has been done, the
Fourth Amendment clearly speaks to substantive as well as procedural un-
fairness and openly proclaims a need to distinguish between reasonable
and unreasonable government policy. For those who believe in a
'substantive due process' approach to the Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment thus seems a far more plausible textual base than the Due
Process Clause itself. For those who believe in general rationality review,
the Fourth, here too, is more explicit than its current doctrinal alternative,
the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
,9o See generally Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93
MCH. L. REV. 1079 (1995).
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trates the consequences of failing to adopt the approach advocated
here with an example that directly implicates the Terry scenario.
As he notes, "there is no constitutional right to sidewalks; in prin-
ciple, walking on sidewalks could be treated as a highly regulated
activity." If so, he points out, the government could interrupt that
activity at will, on the theory that people wishing to get from one
place to another consent to such intrusions just as junkyard deal-
ers consent to random searches of their yards.'91 Noting that the
Court has yet to explain how it would distinguish the two situa-
tions,192 Seidman concludes that "the rejection of Lochner makes it
difficult to evaluate the justice of various background condi-
tions."193 He is right, and that is precisely why we should not re-
ject Lochner in the Fourth Amendment context. Given the gov-
ernment's ability to manipulate our surroundings,' we might
otherwise ultimately face the elimination of concrete justification
requirements for any search or seizure.
3. The Warrant Clause and the Proportionality Principle
To this point, I have not touched upon the role of warrants
under a proportionality regime. Terry, of course, held that a war-
rant was not necessary to authorize a stop and frisk,'95 a holding
that made eminent sense given the exigencies of the situation.
But when there is no exigency, ex ante review of the search by
some independent official might be preferred. Professor Stuntz
has noted that such review both eliminates the hindsight bias that
can infect ex post review and makes perjury by the police difficult,
given their ignorance about what they will find. 96 To these rea-
191 See id. at 1096.
1"2 See id.
193 Id. at 1100.
'9' This is the problem with Professor Stuntz's implicit bargaining model. See Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44
STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992). Professor Stuntz argues, inter alia, that owners of entities
like junkyards would bargain for less protection from government intrusion than the
proportionality rule would dictate, given what the government could do to them (e.g.,
burdensome licensing or reporting mandates) if it was stymied by suspicion require-
ments. But this implicit bargaining idea proves too much because, contrary to Profes-
sor Stuntz's assertion, see id. at 556-67, it applies to ordinary law enforcement as well.
The substantive law could be changed to regulate not just junkyards but sidewalks,
cars and homes in ways that might make lessened Fourth Amendment protection look
comparatively attractive.
E See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'96 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REV. 881, 912-15 (1991).
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sons for ex ante review can be added an obvious third reason: ex
ante review, at least meaningful ex ante review, prevents illegal
searches and seizures and the breach of privacy and trust that
goes with them.
If these reasons convinced one to require before-the-fact
authorization in all non-exigent circumstances, a conflict between
the text of the Fourth Amendment and the proportionality princi-
ple arises. The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause states that
warrants shall issue only upon probable cause.197 Thus, if war-
rants are the vehicle for providing ex ante review, those searches
and seizures which the proportionality approach permits on less
than probable cause could not be authorized by a warrant.
There are three ways of handling this conflict, all sanctioned
by one or more Supreme Court decisions. The first, which I sug-
gested in 1991, is to redefine probable cause to mean "that cause
which makes probable the reasonableness of the intrusion occa-
sioned by a given search or seizure. "'9' This is essentially how
Camara v. Municipal Court99 looked at probable cause in connec-
tion with residential safety inspections. The Court there held that
warrants for such inspections could issue based solely on a
"probable cause" showing that the conditions of the area to be in-
spected merited the intrusion."' Under this sliding scale defini-
tion, probable cause would subsume the four tiers described above
and a warrant could constitutionally authorize searches and sei-
zures in a host of situations which do not require probable cause
as it is presently defined.
If that gambit is considered too confusing, or too inconsistent
with Fourth Amendment history, a second alternative would be
to develop other methods of ex ante review. The Supreme Court
has recognized at least two contexts in which what might simply
be called a "court order" could issue on less than probable cause.
In Hayes v. Florida,0 2 the Court stated in dictum "that under cir-
197 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, (mandating that, "... no warrant shall issue ex-
cept upon probable cause. ").
198 Slobogin, supra note 7, at 76.
19 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
0 See id. at 536.
201 According to Professor Amar at least, "[t]he watering down of 'probable
cause' necessarily authorizes ex parte warrants on loose terms that would have
shocked the Founders .... [In allowing such warrants,] [h]istory has been turned on
its head." Amar, supra note 5, at 785.
202 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
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cumscribed procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the
judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable
cause and his removal to the police station for the purpose of fin-
gerprinting."2 3 In United States v. Karo, 4 the Court indicated
that court orders authorizing beeper tracking of items inside a
residence might constitutionally be issued based on reasonable
205suspicion.
Finally, of course, there is the tack the Court most commonly
prefers; that is to retain the unitary probable cause standard and
insist that ex ante authorizations meet that standard. For the
reasons given above, I prefer the first or second approaches to this
one. It must be admitted that, even with the advent of telephonic
warrants,2 6 the costs of requiring ex ante review for all non-
exigent searches and seizures would not be negligible in a regime
that defines the scope of the Fourth Amendment as broadly as I
would. The costs could be mitigated to some extent by permitting
ex ante review by administrators rather than judges when the
search takes place in an administrative context.0 7 In any event,
the cost, whatever it may be, is worth the extra security.
III. Is THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE AN UNWORKABLE
RORSCHACH BLOT?
Reacting to the proportionality idea six years after Terry was
decided, Anthony Amsterdam made two comments. The first is
one I have stolen for this article: "A sliding scale approach would
considerably ease the strains that the present monolithic model of
the [F]ourth [Amendment almost everywhere imposes on the
process of defining the [Almendment's outer boundaries."2 8 The
second comment was far more critical: "[Piresent law is a positive
paragon of simplicity compared to what a graduated [F]ourth
[A]mendment would produce."0 9 He added that the sliding scale
approach would convert the Fourth Amendment "into one im-
203 Id. at 817.
2'4 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
205 See id. at 718 n.5.
20 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
207 See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 35-36.
2"a Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 393 (1974).
209 id.
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mense Rorschach blot."21°
There is no doubt that the assessment of relative invasiveness
and the multiple tiers of justification that my version of the pro-
portionality principle demands are complex. But this scheme is
not necessarily muddier than the present one. The Court's rulings
often require subtle evaluations of intrusiveness. 21' And the justi-
fication hierarchy described here (as opposed to the degree of cer-
tainty associated with each) is not really that far removed from
the Court's own template.212
If there is a significant difference in clarity between current
law and the rejuvenated proportionality principle advanced in this
paper it may be in the other direction. This proposal makes more
explicit how invasiveness is to be assessed and thus should pro-
vide a clearer picture of the relative intrusiveness of different
types of police actions. It also defines more concisely the types of
justifications the government must put forward.
Finally, the discretion granted police by the proportionality
approach can be bounded in several ways. As I stated in 1991:
First, as has occurred over time with the equally amor-
phous language of the Fourth Amendment, application of
the proportionality principle to recurring situations would
undoubtedly lead to the development of some relatively
clear "rules" .... Second, in developing these rules, only
rough proportionality should be the goal: in some cases,
individual (or state) interests may be sacrificed, at least
marginally, to achieve greater clarity.... Third, where
clear rules do not develop ... the police would at least
have an easily remembered "standard of thumb" that will
help fill in the gaps.... Finally,... if... [ex ante review
210 Id.
211 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (holding that" 'squeezing,
sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket' "went be-
yond the scope of a frisk) (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.
1992)); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (holding that moving a stereo set
to see serial numbers is a search requiring probable cause).
212 The probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards are obviously firmly
ensconced in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Relevance is the standard applied to sub-
poenas, see United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S.292, 301 (1991), and perhaps to
some searches. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 889-90 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the standard the majority adopted for justifying search of
probationer's home does not even amount to reasonable suspicion). As already noted,
supra text accompanying note 73, a clear and convincing standard may be the practical
effect of cases like Winston v. Lee and Berger v. New York, dealing with bodily surgery
and electronic surveillance, respectively.
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is required in all non-exigent circumstances then often]
an independent party, rather than law enforcement offi-
cials, would be applying the proportionality principle.213
CONCLUSION
One of the pamphlets announcing this conference stated that,
since Terry's recognition of the reasonable suspicion standard and
the reasonableness balancing test, "[n]either Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence nor policing in this country has ever been the
same."214 Terry and its progeny did change Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. But Terry probably didn't change law enforcement
practice all that much. Police were conducting preventive stops
and frisks long before that decision.1 Most of the special needs
searches and seizures that have been approved using Terry's bal-
ancing formula were already routine prior to Terry."6 Terry didn't
alter law enforcement practices; it just provided, in the hands of
the post-Warren Court, a rationale for the status quo.
On the other hand, if the underlying rationale of Terry were
dusted off and rejuvenated, law enforcement would never be the
same. All government searches and seizures would be regulated,
not just those that rise above some ill-defined level of intrusion.
Investigations of groups and institutions, as well as of individuals,
would require concrete justification proportionate to the invasion
they perpetrate. All of this could be instituted without denying
law enforcement the ability to be proactive, an ability that would
be circumscribed under a more rigid approach. Given these ad-
vantages, we should not bury Terry, but resurrect it.
213 Slobogin, supra note 7, at 74-75 (footnotes omitted).
214 Pamphlet announcing St. John's University School of Law, Terry v. Ohio 30
Years Later: A Conference on the Fourth Amendment, Law Enforcement and Police-
Citizen Encounters (1998) (on file with St. John's Law Review).
215 See Fyfe, supra note 134 (opining that "Terry had little or no impact on what
police do... in New York City .... Even the 1964 law [setting out the stop and frisk
rules] ... was viewed by street cops as a clarification of longtime practice rather
than as a definition of new authority").
216 See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 368-70 (1959) (canvassing a long his-
tory of statutes permitting warrantless, routine health and safety inspections of
homes).
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